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Climate Change like many global problems nowadays is recognized as a threat to the international security and
cooperation. In theoretical terms, it is being securitized and included in the traditional security studies. Climate
change and its accompanying environmental degradation are perceived to be a threat that can have incalculable
consequences on the international community. The consequences are said to have more effects in small island
developing nations and Africa where many States are fragile and overwhelmed with mounting challenges. In
recent years, the security implications of the climate change are being addressed from national, regional and
multilateral level. Against this backdrop, this paper intends to contribute to the debate on climate change and
international security and present a broader perspective on the discussion. The paper will draw from the EU-Africa
partnership on climate change and is structured as follows: the first part introduces the background of the
international climate change policy and its securitization, the second part covers the EU-Africa relations and
EU-Africa partnership on climate change, and the third part discusses the Congo Basin Forest Partnership as a
concrete example of EU-Africa Partnership on Climate Change. Lastly, the paper concludes by drawing some
conclusions and offers some policy perspectives and recommendations.
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Global climate change challenges have been at the fore-
front of the multilateral agenda in the last quarter of a
century. Beginning with the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol)
of 1987, and the Rio Conventions (UN Convention on
Biological Diversity, UN Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, and UN Convention to Combat Desertifi-
cation) of 1992, climate change issues have become policy
area concerns for many governments across the globe.
This has been true for larger developing countries, least-
developed countries, and industrialized developed ones as
well. As such, because of the nature of the global climate
change challenges, the international community through
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) had embarked on comprehensiveCorrespondence: mahamatkd@gmail.com
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in any medium, provided the original work is pnegotiations aimed at finding adequate solutions to the
adaptation and mitigation of the global climate change.
Major industrialized countries like the United States,
Canada, England, Germany and France, and many emer-
ging ones such as China, India, Russia, South Africa and
Brazil have entered into various coalition and alliances
with like-minded countries in the international fora; con-
vened to discuss, debate, and draft agreements to combat
the threats of the climate change. In that respect, the
United Nations Environment Programme and the World
Meteorological Organization established in 1988 the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
They entrusted it with a mandate to provide the inter-
national community with technical and up to date scien-
tific information on climate change and its effects on the
world at large. Since then, the various reports provided
by the IPCC have served as guiding frameworks through
which governments around the world adopt and respondn Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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eties face.
Subsequently, in 1997, the world community adopted
an international agreement known as the Kyoto Protocol
(KP) at Kyoto, Japan. This accord entered into force in
2005 and was linked with the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change. The main feature of the
agreement was that it set binding targets for the European
Community and 37 major industrialized nations to re-
duce their greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). The tar-
gets covered emission of the six main GHGs, that is,
Carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide
(N2O), Hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs), Perl fluorocarbons
(PFCs) and Sulphur hexafluoride (SFs). In addition, the
Kyoto Protocol also recognized the historical role that
the industrialized countries have played in the emission
of the greenhouse gas given their historical involvement
in the industrial revolution and thus the moral responsi-
bility that they carry in contributing to the global warming
effects.
Ever since the entry into force of the Kyoto Agreement,
the international climate change politics has been dealing
with the question of who should pay the most and what
responsibility should the traditional emitters and larger
emerging developing countries bear in financing the ef-
fects of the climate change in countries and regions of
the world such as Africa that are expected to be hit the
earliest and hardest. As for Africa in particular, according
to the IPCC, she is the region most vulnerable to the ef-
fects of climate variability and change because of her low
adaptive capacity and because many Africans depend on
rain-fed agriculture and natural resources for their exis-
tencea. The report went on to call upon the policy makers
whether in Africa or elsewhere to draft policies and de-
vise strategies aimed at tackling the effects of the global
climate change in Africa and other vulnerable regions of
the world. In regard to Africa, it highlighted the risks and
dangers that tens of millions of Africans would face be-
cause of the increased water stress and spread of malaria
if robust commitments and policies were not put in place
to confront the effects of the climate change.
Moreover, through the UNFCCC, world community
convened in Bali, Indonesia, in 2007 with the objective of
seeking a comprehensive agreement on how to tackle the
pressing issues of climate change. The result was that the
participating governments to the conference adopted
the so-called Bali Road Map (BRM) which included,
among others, the Bali Action Plan (BAP). In short, the
BRM was a set of decisions that participating governments
considered to be the way forward to confronting the cli-
mate change threats. The BAP on the other hand, called
on participating governments to adopt a `shared vision´
for a long-term cooperative action on climate change. Fur-
thermore, two years after the Bali Conference, Copenhagenwith the aim of agreeing to a global deal on the climate
change. Unfortunately, the outcome of the conference was
below everyone’s expectations. Furthermore, in the after-
math of the Copenhagen Summit, world community con-
vened another conference in Cancun, Mexico, whereby
the participating governments agreed on the establish-
ment of a ‘Green Climate Fund’ and thus formalized the
financial commitments made under the Copenhagen Ac-
cord. Finally, the recently held UN conference on the cli-
mate change in Durban, South Africa, was aimed at
reaching agreements on the post 2012 Kyoto Protocol
commitments. The outcome of the conference known as
the Durban Platform agreed on a roadmap for a legally
binding international agreement to combat the climate
change by 2015 and be entered into effect by 2020. It also
agreed on a series of commitments that are beyond the
scope of this paper and therefore, not analyzed in depth.
Over the last two decades or so, there has been growing
concern from the international community over possible
security implications of the global climate change. The
United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), United
States (US), African Union (AU) and many other regions
of the world have recently begun to ask how the security
dimension of climate change will affect access to shared
resources, national security, borders integrity, trade
routes and international political alliances and economic
relations. Against this background, the purpose of this
paper is to examine the possible international security im-
plications of climate change and discuss what the EU is
doing in addressing possible threats of climate change on
Europe itself. This will be done through the assessment of
the initiatives that the European Union and Africa, South
of the Sahara, have attempted to take in order to assist
Africa to confront its adaptation and mitigation chal-
lenges of the global climate change while maintaining its
primary goals of reducing poverty and implementing its
sustainable development strategies.
The paper will discuss the Africa-EU Partnership on
Climate Change and show what has been achieved to
date. It will introduce the EU flagship instrument on cli-
mate change with Africa, namely, the Global Climate
Change Alliance (GCCA), and present its innovative ap-
proaches. Finally, the paper will summarize the main
points discussed and present challenges for the Africa-
EU Partnership on Climate Change and offer recommen-
dations to African and EU policymakers.
Climate change and international security
Climate change has become one of the main concerns of
the European and International politics. It poses serious
risks and threats to the international and human security
in many parts of the world, as well shown in the fourth
assessment report released by the IPCC in 2007b. Before
examining the security dimension of the climate change,
Dodo SpringerPlus 2014, 3:194 Page 3 of 18
http://www.springerplus.com/content/3/1/194a brief introduction is needed on what constitutes inter-
national security threat and how the concepts of human
security and communities are defined. According to the
report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, international peace and security was defined as
“any event or process that leads to large-scale death or
lessening of life chances and undermines States as the
basic unit of the international systemc”. Based on this
given definition, the panel identified six groups that consti-
tute threats: interstate conflict; internal conflict; terrorism;
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; transnational or-
ganized crime; and economic and social threats including
disease, extreme poverty, and environmental degradation.
On the other hand, the concepts of the security of individ-
uals and communities and national security are defined in
the Human Development Report 1994 as “security symbol-
ized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, un-
employment, crime, social conflict, political repression and
environmental hazardsd”.
Based on the above- mentioned assessments of what
constitutes threats as identified by the IPCC and the risks
that they can pose to the international security, the UN,
US, EU, AU and many major emerging powers such as
China, India, South Africa, Brazil, and Russia started to
look into the potential threats of the climate change on
their national security, and to a larger extent, on inter-
national security very seriously. Thus, at the international
level, since 2007, the UN has begun to mobilize inter-
national response and raise awareness on the implica-
tions of the climate change on international security.
This began as a response to the acceptance of a concept
paper circulated by the delegation of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Security
Council members on April 3, 2007e.
The concept paper (S/2007/186) was aimed at asking
the Security Council members to hold an open debate
on the relationship between energy, security and climate.
It was conceived by the UK delegation as part of the Se-
curity Council´s ongoing efforts to play a leading and
constructive role in conflict prevention as stated in reso-
lution 1625, adopted at a Council Heads of State-level
meeting during the 2005 World Summit. The content of
the concept paper goes as follows:
The UK concept paper places discussion of climate
change within the resolution´s reaffirmation of promoting
sustainable development as one of the broader strategies
required to prevent conflict. The concept paper argues
that increasing dependency on fossil fuels could result in
climate change being accelerated, which would result in
several types of impacts which combined might in turn
increase the risk of conflict and insecurity. It identified the
following wider implications of climate change and dis-
cussed their potential impact on issues closely associated
with threats to international peace and security: Border disputes;
 Migration;
 Energy supplies;
 Other resource shortages, such as water, cultivable
land and fish stocks;
 Societal stress; and
 Humanitarian crises.
In addition, this concept paper recognized the import-
ance that the effects of the climate change could have on
the environment; however, it directed the Council mem-
bers to aim the debate on the security dimension of the
impact of climate change. In so doing, it suggested that
the Security Council members should debate and address
among others, the following points:
 Prioritization of the risks climate change poses to
international peace and security and the
identification of new risks;
 The role the Security Council can play in an
integrated UN approach to conflict prevention,
including a greater emphasis on climate-related
factors;
 The role of the Secretariat in better informing the
Council and the wider UN membership of the
security risks posed by climate change and
the promotion of a more coherent response
throughout the UN system.
Nevertheless, despite the positive acceptance of the UK
paper by fellow Security Council members, many coun-
tries such as China, India and the Group of 77 (G77)
rejected the idea of having to debate the issues of the cli-
mate change in the context of international security.
They argued that the issues of the climate change should
be dealt with by the General Assembly and the Economic
and Social Council. From regional and national level per-
spectives, some of the widely accepted potential risks that
climate change can create for the international security
and some regions of the world are mass internal and
cross-border migrations. As a response to this widely-
held knowledge, many technical and policy studies have
been commissioned to look into the situations in a com-
prehensive way. For example, according to the report by
the Center for American Progress on Global Warning
the Security Challenge of Climate Change, the “three re-
gions in which climate-induced migration will present
the greatest geopolitical challenges are: South Asia,
Africa and Europe”.
Another report, among others, that looked into the
threat of the climate change on national security is the
panel of retired army generals assembled by the United
States Center for Naval Analysis (CAN). The panel was
asked to study the issue of climate change with regard to
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port of the panel was released in 2007, and in it, climate
change was defined as having the capacity to act as a
`threat multiplier´f. That is, according to the report, cli-
mate change risks can exacerbate ongoing challenges
and make untenable situations worse. Political stability
could easily unravel if climate change risks are not ad-
dressed in timely manner. The said findings of the Panel
received wider acceptance within the US policy making
circles and in the international community as well. For
instance, the current Secretary General of the UN Ban
Ki-Moon agreed with the assessment of the Panel of the
retired Generals while addressing the Security Council
in 2007. In his speech he said that the concept of threat
multiplier was “especially true in vulnerable regions that
face multiple stresses at the same time- pre-existing con-
flict, poverty and unequal access to resources, weak in-
stitutions, food insecurity, and the incidence of diseases
such as HIV/AIDSg”.
As regards to China, the Chinese position on the impli-
cations of climate change on national security can be cat-
egorized as official and non-official. That is to say, on the
one hand, leading Chinese scholars and international rela-
tions experts such as Zhang Haibin of Beijing University
have all recognized that climate change could pose a ser-
ious threat to the Chinese national security. Professor
Zhang for instance, has made it clear that Chinese polit-
ical leadership should consider the implications of climate
change as a natural security matter beyond the traditional
concept of security that they dearly hold. His views were
further developed and argued in his 2010 book titled Cli-
mate Change and China’s National Security. Though the
views of many of those experts and advocates are clearly
influenced by the ongoing international debates on the
climate security and the stance taken by the US, UN, EU
and other developed countries on that subject, the Chin-
ese government has not publicly accepted that position.
Though it accepts that climate change is a serious issue
that it needs to tackle with utmost urgency, the Chinese
government nonetheless does not recognize it as a na-
tional security matter as do major developed countries.
This is because for China or better said for official China,
climate change is an economic issue that should be
treated as a development challenge rather than strictly
viewed as a security matter. This Chinese policy position
was firstly expressed when the United Kingdom initiated
a debate on climate change and national security in the
UNSC in 2007.
Unlike the US and many other developed countries,
China and several developing countries opposed the de-
bate and the politicization of the climate change security
at the UNSC level. The main point of their opposition
was that the UNSC was not mandated to take upon itself
the issues of global warming and that doing so wouldsimply undermine other UN organizations such as the
UNGA that are appropriate for it. Chinese Ambassador
before the UN, Liu Zhimin, for instance, stated that “the
developing countries believe that the Security Council
neither has the expertise in handling climate change, nor
is the right decision-making place for extensive partici-
pation”. At the same time, during the debate, Ambassa-
dor Liu, also pronounced what is the official Chinese
government position as far as the climate change secur-
ity debate was concerned. That is, he noted that “Cli-
mate change may have certain security implications, but
generally speaking, it is in essence an issue of sustainable
development.”
Therefore, the position of the Chinese leadership and
government in Beijing has been all along to accept the
urgency of the climate change as a non-traditional secur-
ity matter but not strictly a national security issue as es-
poused by many Western and developed countries. This
position is in fact shared by the highest Chinese leader-
ship and expressed in international forums whenever
possible. For example, during President Hu Jintao´s visit
to the meeting on energy security and climate change in
Japan in July 2008, Mr. Hu Jintao said the following:
“The climate change problem fundamentally speaking
is a development problem, and must be
comprehensively solved in the framework of
sustainable development. International cooperation on
climate change must start from correctly handling the
triple relationship between economic growth, social
development and protection of the environment, and
must have guaranteeing economic development as its
core, and strengthening sustainable development as
its goal. It must have saving energy, improving the
energy structure and strengthening ecological
protection as its focus, and have scientific progress as
a support, so as to continuously raise the capacity of
international society to mitigate and adapt to climate
change.”
Though the official Chinese leadership position on cli-
mate change and national security differs from the views
advocated by some of its scholars and international rela-
tions analysts, it is worth recalling that China has signifi-
cantly contributed to the debates on climate change
internationally. One may even say, without any exagger-
ation that China and the EU have been at the forefront of
the international leadership debate on the climate change.
Hence, unlike the US, UK, EU and other developed coun-
tries, China’s international cooperation on the climate
change security simply differs on what the Chinese lead-
ership views as an urgent economic problem that needs
urgent global solutions rather than a strictly national se-
curity as advocated by Western countries in general. It
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the direct link between the climate change implications
and its national security imperatives.
Ideology and politics aside, it is worth noting that over
the last years, China´s leadership has engaged the Inter-
national Community with its food system. China has
established a partnership on climate change with Africa,
and has also considerably contributed to Africa´s capacity
to adapting to and mitigating against the impacts of the
climate change. As regards to the Climate Change and En-
vironmental Protection challenges that Africa faces, Chinese
government is committed to helping African countries
enhance their capacity building in meteorological infra-
structures and forest protection and management, and
assisting them in disaster prevention, treatment of desert-
ification, ecological protection and environmental manage-
ment. China has also set up a dialogue and cooperation
mechanisms on climate change with South Africa and sev-
eral other African countries. For instance, the Hu Jintao´s
Presidency even made it clear that it would actively pro-
mote China-Africa cooperation in climate change and as-
sist Africa to address all the impacts of the climate change.
As an example, it sponsored two study courses on the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) aimed at improv-
ing the abilities of African and Asian developing countries
to carry out CDM projects.
This policy approach is unlikely to change under President
Xi Jinping given the importance that his Presidency
has accorded Africa in his first overseas forays and policy
declarations. On his first visit to Tanzania, the Republic of
Congo, and on his way to the fifth annual BRICS Summit
held in Durban, South Africa, in March 2013, President Xi
reiterated China´s commitment to make Africa central in
its foreign policy and provide it with assistance for its de-
velopmental challenges; and thus strengthen Africa-China
strategic partnerships by providing aid, scholarship, and
facilitating technology transfer towards the continent.
Therefore, this internationalism with a special reference
to Africa is a clear indication that China intends to
deepen its cooperation and strengthen all aspects of its
partnerships with Africa, and thus, compete with Europe
as well as the rest of the world in its engagement with the
continent.
At the European level, the EU has been at the forefront
of the policy initiatives on climate change and its poten-
tial risks for many years. Over the course of the last de-
cades, it has participated in various multilateral climate
change negotiations and actively contributed in many of
the international climate change policies. Hence, since
the advent of the new millennium, the potential risks and
threats of the climate change on the European security
have taken prominent places in many of the major policy
papers of the European Union. For instance, in the up-
dated 2008 version of the European Security Strategy andthe paper prepared by the EU´s High Representative for
Common foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)h and the
Report on the Implementation of the European Security
Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World,i cli-
mate change-related security threats on the European
continent have become one of the key global issues on
the EU international policy agenda. In effect, the EU
views climate change as serious threats to its interests,
and as a result of that, it has received wide support from
the EU citizens in pursuing its overall climate change
policiesj.
Lastly, from the African perspective, the issue of cli-
mate change and its security implications are widely dis-
cussed by the government officials of respective African
countries; and as a result, there is a growing awareness
among the leaders of the continent on the subject. For
example, the President of Uganda, Yoweni Musevini is
famously quoted as saying that climate change is an ag-
gressive act of the developed world against the develop-
ing world (Masood 2007). However, setting aside the
recognition that African leaders grant to the climate
change and its accompanying environmental degrada-
tions, they nevertheless perceive the security risk aspects
of the climate change as another layer of mounting is-
sues on top of the many existing challenges that they
already face. That is, namely, the development problems,
social unrest, conflicts over natural resources and civil
wars, a burgeoning population, staggering youth un-
employment, AIDS induced social crises and the cap-
acity building challenges related to the attainment of the
UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Henceforth, with all these challenges already present,
the African leaders know that the security dimension of
the climate change is something that is looming over the
continent; nevertheless, they only seem to focus their
time and energy on solving the pressing issues at hand.
In fact, for many African leaders, they view the security
risks of the climate change as additional global problems
created by the developed world that simply need a con-
certed response from the international community see
Jo-Ansie Van (2010)k. Yet, it is worth noting that for
many of the African leaders, their pressing concerns
about the security aspects of the climate change lie in
the human security in Africa. That is so because of the
direct consequences that that create in the areas of in-
ternal migration over natural resources and border con-
flicts and external migration that push the young and
skilled Africans towards other African countries, Europe
and other foreign destinations. Notwithstanding this, the
African Union (AU) for instance, has debated the im-
pacts of the climate change during the 8th Summit of
the AU in 2007 and has as well taken the view that it
regards climate change as a threat to the continent´s fu-
ture well-being. However, what it has not done though is
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change as a security concern as seen and perceived in
the Western capitals.
The prevailing discourse of the climate change impacts
on the international security is based on the traditional
security rationale. That is, the notion of threats to the
national security as understood by the State and the
military establishments is well understood and widely
discussed in the security literature. However, given that
the potential impacts of the climate change are defined
as non-traditional security threats, in order to truly
understand the challenges of the climate change on the
international security such as climate-induced migration,
non-traditional security approaches are warranted. That
is to say, the international community and the inter-
national organizations ought to shift their discourse of
the climate-induced migration to the underlying socio-
economic reasons that impel millions of vulnerable peo-
ples to leave their homes and migrate. By doing so, one
may understand the impacts that conflicts, war, poverty,
and economic deprivation have on marginalized house-
holds, communities, and the rural poor. These above-
cited factors can then be as compelling of a motive as
the potential impacts of climate change on migration
within a region of a given country or outside of it all to-
gether. This approach regards the socio-economic prob-
lems as the sources of many migrations even though the
traditional security approach views the impacts of the
climate change as the drivers for the mass-migration of
millions of people originating in the areas affected by
the climate change.
Therefore, the potential impacts of the climate change
on the international security ought to be addressed by
non-traditional security measures if peoples were made
as the referent object of the discourse and analysis of the
climate change. This view however, cannot be applied if
the concept of the security is not broadened. That is,
what is to be secured when addressing the challenges
and threats of the climate change on the international
security? Generally, as Lorraine Elliott pointed out, “the
dangers and threats associated with climate change-
induced migration are often articulated in terms of the
possible detrimental impacts on the security interests of
the United States, Europe and others”l.
With that said, the international community should link
non-traditional security challenges such as climate change
with other socio-economic problems as discussed-above
in order to address the underlying sources of the human
insecurity. That is to say, instead of addressing the chal-
lenges and potential threats of the climate change from
the traditional security measures, i.e., military and defense
responses, strategies that focus on sustainable economic
development, social resilience mechanisms, land distribu-
tion and reforms, transparent system of property rights,gender equity policies, disaster risk management and lo-
calized food system should be promoted and integrated
into national development policy plans.
Climate Change and International Cooperation
Undoubtedly, climate change issues are global concerns
that clearly warrant a concerted international response
and cooperation. Therefore, the security implications of
the climate change can only be effectively addressed if
the international community tackles the said threats in a
non-political and comprehensive way. That is to say, if
well addressed by the international community, climate
change can be a catalyst for better international cooper-
ation. Developed countries and developing countries
alike can map out multi-level strategies to successfully
seek solutions for the various risk aspects of the climate
change. For example, climate-induced migration, shared-
resource conflicts, potential territory losses due to the
rising sea-level will not be solved by any one country.
Hence, they will all require international cooperation in
order to effectively be managed. Doing so will without a
doubt help the international community handle the se-
curity challenges of climate change at a multilateral level
rather than leaving them to the resource-challenged and
fragile states. In that respect, the EU has been advocating
a multilateral response to the implications of the climate
change on the international and regional security given
that it considers it as a global problem. By making the cli-
mate change be recognized as a global problem, the EU
has then intended to push for greater international sup-
port for climate change mitigation and adaptation, good
governance and natural resource management, technol-
ogy transfer and capacity building for crisis management
of many developing countries. It also has equipped itself
with an array of tools that can be used in its regional
strategies such as the EU Neighborhood Policy, EU-
Africa Strategy, and EU-Central Asia Strategy and EU-
Middle East action plan in order to help assist countries
deal with the impacts of climate change very effectively.
In the case of Africa for instance, the EU has undeni-
ably various tools, inter alia, development policy instru-
ments that it can use to assist Africa manage the impacts
of the climate change on its security. It can do so within
the context of the EU-Africa Partnership on climate
change. As such, the EU has recognized that not doing so
will inevitably have consequences on its international co-
operation and of many African countries as well. There-
fore, if the international community fails to grasp the
importance of cooperation on the threats of the climate
change, the international relations among many countries
can consequently, be affected through forced climate mi-
gration, trans-boundary conflicts over shared resources
and territory losses due to the rising sea. As a case in
point, open border policy within the EU can be called
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member countries could become an important policy
problem for the Union and its 28 member states as well.
Climate change is considered by all countries today to
be one of the pressing multinational issues or better said
a serious “non-traditional security challenge” that re-
quires global responses. Vulnerable developing countries
and least-developed ones are expected to be hit the earli-
est and hardest. However, Africa, among all continents
is said to bear the brunt of the climate change effects in
terms of food security, sustainable water supply and ex-
treme weather phenomena such as floods, drought and
threats of desertification, according to the IPCCm. As an
example, the economies of many communities, coun-
tries, and sub-regions of Africa, are already being hit by
the devastating effects of the desert encroachment partly
because of the climate change and also because of the
land degradation caused by local practices. Conse-
quently, developing countries, least-developed countries,
as well as rich industrialized ones are all engaged in new
partnerships and alliances with the intent to address the
global challenges of climate change.
Hence, addressing those climate change problems that
besiege many countries requires mutual trust and shared
common visions among all countries of the world, i.e.,
EU engagement with Africa and Small Islands Develop-
ing States on climate change. In this respect, the EU and
Africa, following the 11th Ministerial Meeting of the
African and EU Troikan that took place in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, on 20 and 21 November 2008, jointly identified
priority areas for action on the climate change that need
to be addressed in order for Africa to address the adap-
tation and mitigation concerns of the climate change
challenges. In addition to the identified priority areas for
action as mentioned-above, the EU also launched the
GCCA program whose main objective is to assist the
LDCs and Small Islands Developed States (SDIS) adapt
and mitigate the effects of the climate change challenges
given their resources and technology constraints. In
short, the following are the summary of the said priority
areas for action in Africa-EU cooperation on climate
change (see Ministerial Meeting of the African and EU
Troika (2008) Africa-EU Declaration on Climate Change
and Table 1): 1) Investment and financing possibilities in
support of adaptation and mitigation initiatives in Africa;
2) Strengthening African capacities to better exploit op-
portunities under the carbon markets; 3) Water re-
sources management and adaptation of agriculture; 4)
Desertification, land degradation and scarcity of water;
5) Urban development; 6) Reduction of deforestation
and degradation of the forests; 7) Sustainable manage-
ment of firewood supply; 8) Access to energy and energy
efficiency; 9) Sea level rise, small islands and deltas adap-
tation; 10) Development of renewable energy, notablysolar in Sahara; 11) Support and cooperation on pollu-
tion inventories including GHG; and 12) Disaster risk
reduction.
The EU member states and their African partner coun-
tries are looking to tackle the climate change problems
that they are facing by engaging and entering into alli-
ances with partners that are willing to share their experi-
ences and best practices on how to deal with energy
security, environmental concerns, climate change and
sustainable development challenges. Although Africa is
supposed to be the most affected continent as cited by
many studies in that respect and alluded to previouslyo
addressing the issue nowadays has become a paramount
national security for all nations of the globe. Hence, cli-
mate change is one of the main issues alongside global
security that many countries use to seek alliances and
partnerships in international fora that offer political or
technical support and assistance. The rationale behind
entering into those alliances by many governments and
policymakers in that matter is to tap into other govern-
ments and institutions that may provide valuable know-
ledge sharing, expertise and best practices towards the
looming global warming threats. The European Union
and Africa have become very active on the international
scene in seeking strategic partners that share their com-
mon objectives through bilateral or multilateral coalition
buildings. For example, they do so by increasing their
voices, visibility, strategic alliances and partnerships
within multilateral institutions such as the UNFCCC, the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
In addition to seeking partners multilaterally as
mentioned-earlier, the EU and Africa have also entered
into bilateral joint strategic partnerships in order to en-
hance their political dialogue and deal with what they call
issues of mutual concerns such as the climate change
challenges. A case in point is the EU engagement in
Africa through the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership on
Climate Change and Environment and the support that
the EU explicitly extends to the Climate for development
in Africa program referred to as ClimDev Africa. This is
an African initiative that seeks to make required informa-
tion on climate change available to all African decision
makers. Although the climate change challenge is no lon-
ger disputed by any country in the world, though the way
to go about adapting to it and mitigating its effects and
fully accepting its historic responsibility differs, the reality
is that countries enter negotiations on climate change
based on their national economic and security interests.
That is so because countries in general base their climate
change negotiation strategies on domestic interests driven
by powerful stakeholders and local realities. This in effect
is the reason why the United States government was luke-
warm about the Kyoto Protocol and the Congress refused
Table 1 GCCA support to African national programs
Country Partners GCCA Priority
Areas
Sectors Budget Duration
Benin UNDP, Ministry of Interior and Public
Security, Ministry of Environment,
Habitat and Urbanism, National
Geographical Institute, National
Remote Detection Centre, National
Centre for the Management of Fauna
Reserves







Ministry of Environment, Nature
Conservation and Tourism, Congolese
Institute for Nature Conservation,
Centre for International Forestry
Research
REDD Forestry Total value: €14.0 million (GCCA) 2012 to 2017









Total value: €13.7 million (GCCA,
including €8 million EC fast start
funding)
2011 to 2015
Mali Ministry of Environment and
Sanitation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and International Cooperation
REDD Forestry Total value: €6.215 million (GCCA:
€5.65 million; and Government of
Mali: €0.565 million)
2010 to 2016
Mauritius Ministry of Environment and






Total value: €3 million (GCCA) 2010 to 2013
Energy
Mozambique Ministry for the Coordination of the
Environmental Action, Ministry of





Total value: €47 million (GCCA:
€15.2 million, including €5 million
fast start funding from Ireland




Rwanda Rwanda Natural Resources Authority,
Ministry of Natural Resources
Adaptation Land Management Total value: €4.55 million (GCCA) 2010 to 2012
Senegal Directorate for Environment and




Total value: €4 million (GCCA) 2010 to 2015
Seychelles National Climate Change Committee,
Ministry of Home Affairs,






Total value: €2 million (GCCA) 2010 to 2012
Energy
Sierra Leone Forestry Division of the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Food
Security
REDD Forestry Total value: €5 million (GCCA, fast
start funding from Ireland)
2012 to 2016
Tanzania Ministry of Finance, Vice-President´s
Office- Division of Environment,
Community Forest Pemba, Institute of












The Gambia Ministry of Finance and Economic
Affairs, National Environment Agency,
Department of Water Resources,






Total value: €3.86 million (GCCA) 2012 to 2015
Coastal zone
management
Uganda Ministry of Water and Environment,




Agriculture Total value: €11 million (GCCA,
fast start funding from Ireland)
2012 to 2016
Source: European Union Commission, 2011: Global Climate Change Alliance.
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Bush decided to withdraw the US from the parties of the
Kyoto Protocol. Viewing this situation and understanding
the politics of the International Climate Change Regime
negotiations, one may be inclined to think that the leading
countries in the EU, the US, Canada, China, India and
other emerging powers as well as the African group on cli-
mate change negotiations and the Caribbean and Pacific
Islands States representations should maybe focus on less
contentious issues, and expend more energy and efforts
onto the areas where divergence of positions are less con-
siderable; i.e., the so-called `low-hanging fruit.´
The United States, EU, China, India, South Africa and
Brazil considered as the leading climate change negotia-
tors in the multilateral institutions should forge common
positions on a given number of issues whereby showing
concrete results in their efforts towards a common goal
will incite the laggard and reluctant countries to follow
their leadership. Doing so will create a momentum that
the international community can seize upon to devise
comprehensive international strategies to manage the glo-
bal challenges of the climate change while adhering to the
principle of “common but differentiated responsibility”.
That is to say, to adopt clear strategies for the climate
change adaptation, mitigation and the mainstreaming of
climate-induced development challenges for the develop-
ing and least-developed countries into their sustainable
development policies. Adopting this approach will cer-
tainly bring so many countries closer in their attempts to
tackle their local climate change challenges. For, countries
will be inclined to sharing their resources and technolo-
gies and best practices in adapting and mitigating climate
change challenges for the greater global common good.
For instance, the Pacific Islands and Caribbean Developing
States that are more concerned of the rising sea-level
threats can enter into alliances with advanced industrial-
ized countries and gain tremendous experiences and
knowledge and tap into their expertise on how to deal with
those issues. The same can be said about the African coun-
tries as well. For instance, it is common knowledge that
many African countries use fossil fuels as their main
sources of energy for their electricity supply. Therefore, en-
tering into strategic alliances with the industrialized coun-
tries targeting the issues of the climate change adaptation
and mitigation can without a doubt help them acquire
technologies that they need in order to successfully make
the transition from fossil fuel energy policies to low carbon
clean energy development through efficient technologies.
Another area where a strategic partnership can be of a
greater benefit to Africa is the area of the Food-Based
Dietary Guidelines (FBDGs). In Africa, many households
and communities suffer chronic hunger, and as a conse-
quence, millions of families are subject to nutrient-related
diseases. China which has developed an impressive andrespectable food system in the last three decades can share
its expertise in that field and assist Africa to alleviate its
nutritional problems. The Chinese Nutrition Society has
been a member of the International Union of Nutritional
Sciences since the year 1985. This membership and its ex-
tensive experience in community-oriented research in nu-
trition science is an asset that Africa can draw upon and
strengthen its own locally-customized Food-Based Dietary
Guidelines (FBDGs). China´s success in nutrition science
has been remarkable in its achievements over the last three
decades simply because it is mainly based on households
and communities. That is to say, families and community-
oriented research institutions are at the center of its food-
based strategy. As M. L. Wahlqvist pointed-out, “a funda-
mental feature of the ability of China to play an early and
foundation role in the development of the FBDGs in 1995
was that its nutrition scientists maintained a thread of
basic community-oriented research during the most diffi-
cult times and rapidly re-asserted themselves once the op-
portunity arosep.” In essence, this operationalization is
where cooperation with China can help Africa devise a
strong and robust food system strategy that can help it ad-
dress the problems of chronic hunger and nutrient-
deficient diseases that many African families suffer.
To do so however, both China and Africa will have to
devise a food system strategy that is inclusive of rural and
urban communities and households (Wahlqvist 2009).
That is to say, respective governments of the African
countries and its Chinese counterpart have to put fam-
ilies, women and children at the center of their national
food systems and health policies. In doing so, their food
traditions and historical peculiarities (rural and urban)
will be retained and the food systems that they will have
put in place will reflect the local needs of their house-
holds and their communities alike.
The threats and challenges of climate change on
European and African Securities
From the scientific viewpoint, there is a widespread
agreement based on technical studies that the African
continent will be the hardest hit as a consequence of the
climate change impacts. The potential threats on the se-
curity of Europe, i.e., the European Union and Africa are
the subject of this section. The risks of climate change
that are generally attributed to potential security impli-
cations fall into four categories: 1) the issues related to
water access and scarcity; 2) the issues related to the de-
crease of food security for the general population; 3) the
issues related to the climate-induced migration; and 4)
the issues related to the impact of the climate change on
poverty reduction and sustainable development and state
incapacity (fragile states) to cope with the said chal-
lenges. When analyzing the issues related to the water
access and scarcity in the context of climate change,
Dodo SpringerPlus 2014, 3:194 Page 10 of 18
http://www.springerplus.com/content/3/1/194there are three elements that need to be taken into con-
sideration. First, there is a danger that climate change
challenges can exacerbate the already existing water
stress in Africa whereby water interdependence among
many countries can easily lead to conflicts. Second, in-
creased variability of waterfall due to the precipitation
patterns, heavy rainfall at times and a lack of adequate
infrastructure to capture and storage the water in many
poor African countries can be a source of many social
and economic unrest. Third, there is an assumption that
water stress can directly cause conflicts among coun-
tries. However, this viewpoint is not at all conclusive be-
cause some studies show that water stress is not usually
a cause of conflicts among states and, quite the contrary,
it actually engenders cooperation rather than conflicts
(Wolf et al. 2005).
Nevertheless, there are other studies that point out that
sharing river basin can be a source of conflicts among
countries (Gleditsch et al. 2006), and that water could also
be the source of conflicts at a community level (WBGU
German Advisory Council on Global Change 2007). As
for the issues related to the decrease of food security for
the general population in Africa, what many studies (CAN
2007 and WBGU German Advisory Council on Global
Change 2007) have pointed out is the concern of a grow-
ing population on the African continent and the lagging
agricultural production to keep pace with it, and the con-
sequences that result from this disequilibrium; i.e., food
shortages, undernourishment of millions of Africans and
food security-induced migration. In addition, given that
Africa´s agriculture production in many instances is tied
to rainfall, any climate change variability could exacerbate
the food insecurity situation if more arable lands were to
turn into extensive dry lands.
Added to these challenges is a flurry of land deals and
leases by international investors and foreign countries in
Africa in the last ten years. For instance, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) has acquired 74,000 acres of land
in the Sudan and intends to grow wheat, corn, potatoes
and beans for its domestic population. China has also
acquired seven million acres in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) to produce palm oil for its own domes-
tic consumption. India, South Korea and Malaysia are
also very involved in land deals across Africa and princi-
pally in the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Madagascar. According
to Brown (2011), in 2009, Saudi Arabia received its first
shipment of rice produced on land it had acquired in
Ethiopia. As such, these acquisitions of African lands
add another layer of challenge to the existing food inse-
curity of millions of African households. However, many
voices argue that this type of investment and projects
will bring opportunities to Africa in its fight against the
impacts of the climate change on food security. The op-
portunities here are understood as the transfer ofmodern technology and techniques of food production,
and the improved infrastructure that will ensue. In con-
trast, other voices refute this assertion and point out
that there is a danger that this production will not bene-
fit Africans, and in the long-run this will prove counter-
productive (Cotula et al. 2009). This viewpoint is also
shared and well-articulated by Wahlqvist, McKay, Chang
and Chiu in “Rethinking the food security debate in
Asia: some missing ecological and health dimensions
and solutions” (2012). They argue that, “our own view is
that the long-term risks with such projects for African
and poorer Asian nations may outweigh these potential
benefits, particularly given the political realities and
power relations in these developing nations. Also, the
investing nations may generate resentment and accusa-
tions of continued forms of `colonial´ exploitation, when
Asian nations would probably be better off attempting,
to enhance their own level of internal food securityq.”
It is widely known that Africa´s food security situation
is critical. Out of 36 countries worldwide currently facing
food insecurity, 21 are African (United Nations 2009).
According to the same source (United Nations 2009),
more than 300 million Africans are chronically hungry.
This represents slightly more than a third of the contin-
ent´s population. And out of this number, Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO) (2008) estimates that at least
235 million live in sub-Saharan African countries. This,
proportionately, makes sub-Saharan Africa among the re-
gions of the world with a high number of chronically
hungry people. Against this backdrop, Africa´s poorest
and landless families, women, children and marginalized
communities face a serious challenge to secure their food
safety and security considering that their incomes have
been falling due to the volatility of the food prices since
the 2007–2008 international food crises. In light of this
situation, African policymakers, international commu-
nity, and the international organizations ought to re-
assess the prevailing approaches to tackling the impacts
of the climate change on food security in Africa. That is
to say, adaptive strategies such as reliance on foreign aid,
NGOs, development agencies and global food trade as
supported and promoted by major international organi-
zations and developed countries. Though the above-
outlined organizations and agencies have been providing
responses to Africa as a whole in its fight against the im-
pacts of the climate change, it is clear to any astute ob-
server that the lack of coordination and policy coherence
among those organizations makes their policy responses
short of everyone´s expectations.
In essence, African governments should elaborate a
broader and integrative climate change policy across the
continent whereby food safety and food security should
be a priority in each country´s national development
strategy. In doing so, they can present a coherent African
Dodo SpringerPlus 2014, 3:194 Page 11 of 18
http://www.springerplus.com/content/3/1/194response to the international community and press the
international organizations of global governance such as
the EU, UN, G8 and G20, and present them with a single
voice on what approach they deem effective to tackling
the effects of the climate change on their food security.
This integrative and broader response from African gov-
ernments should however be locally based. That is, the
policy approach should be designed to first address the
food safety and food security of the localities, regional,
and national communities, in order to develop resilient
food systems across the African countries. The benefits
of doing so will have implications beyond the challenges
of the food security and its implications on peace and sta-
bility in the continent. As an example, this scenario was
well pointed out by Wahlqvist et al. (2012) when arguing
for the rationale and benefits of designing a resilient and
sustainable food system in Asia. Hence, they said as
follows:
“…the design of resilient and sustainable food systems
is not just a matter of welfare and equity but could have
major implications for the stability and peace of this key
regionr”.
This approach however, does not exclude the assist-
ance of the international community or cooperation with
the development agencies and NGOs that are specialized
in addressing this issue. Resorting to those agencies
however, should only be made in the time of distress or
unforeseen natural disasters. Hence, redefining the con-
cept of food security and adopting this purely locally
based-solution against the impacts of the climate change
could contribute to the development efforts and peace
and stability of the region. Not doing so however, could
prove to be a bigger obstacle against the African devel-
opment strategy and economic gains. Thus, as Mark L.
Wahlqvist, John McKay, Ya-Chen Chang and Ya-Wen
Chiu have asserted, “as populations increase and the full
impacts of climate change are felt, competition for the
scarce resources of food and water has the potential to
destabilize the region and undermine the many develop-
ment gains that have been achieved in recent years”
(Chellaney 2011; McDonald 2010; McKay 2009)s.
In respect to the climate-induced migrations, there
could either be an internal migration or external migra-
tion due to the risks and threats of climate change. First,
affected populations by the variability of the climate
change may just choose to move from their natural habi-
tats to a different region within the same country. This
unfortunately, could create tensions and conflicts over
resources of the host region. When this phenomenon is
extended to other countries in the region, it can then
easily blow into a major regional crisis where displaced
populations become refugee crises victims. Second, it is
also argued that climate-induced migration could be the
result of sea-level rise and flooding that would displacemany people and incite them to look for new life oppor-
tunities in distant lands. And in the case of many Africans
and South Asians, the destination is usually Europe while
the northern part of the continent is used as a transit re-
gion before arriving at the target one (see Figures 1 and 2
key migrant routes from Africa to Europe). This inter-
national migration however, is seen and perceived as gen-
erating security concerns not only in the transit countries
but also in the target areas. In this case, the security
threats are to be in the European countries because they
are the ones taking in thousands of immigrants and deal-
ing with all the ramifications of what that entails.
The implications of the threats by climate change on
the European security are manifold. However, in this
paper, we focus our analysis on two of the main climate
change risks on the European Security, i.e., the European
Union. These two security risks are namely: climate in-
duced migration to the European shores from Africa and
Asia and potential risks on the Energy supply route to
the European countries.
First, the risk that induced climate migrants from Africa
and Asia can pose to the European security is exacerbating
the already existing tension between the many immigrants
in Europe and the native populations. For example, in
many major European Union countries such as Germany,
France, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium, there is con-
stant tension between Muslims immigrants and their not
well integrated children and the non-counterpart native
populations. Therefore, if the induced-climate migrants
were to be Muslims or otherwise in a substantial number,
for example, this could easily raise the level of existing ten-
sion and potentially fuel anti-immigrants, anti-Muslims
feelings just like what we have witnessed over the recent
years in France, Denmark and the Netherlands. Conse-
quently, this can strengthen the nationalist anti-immigrant
backlash that is growing in many European countries. Fur-
ther, if this potential risk is coupled with the current eco-
nomic situation in many EU countries such as Spain,
Portugal, Greece, and Italy that have opened their doors to
millions of immigrants in the last decade or so, the pro-
spect of not managing well the issue of increased immigra-
tion could have direct consequences on the EU internal
cohesion itself
Second, climate change potential security risks on Europe
could also come from the climate impacted energy pro-
ducing and exporting countries to the European mar-
ket. That is, if countries such as Nigeria, Algeria, and
Equatorial Guinea among others were to be severely af-
fected by climate change, gas and oil supply and distribu-
tion into the European market could easily be disrupted.
In this scenario, many European countries will face eco-
nomic and security problems because oil prices will likely
rise and that can have negative impacts on economic
growth. In addition, this potential energy security risk
Figure 1 Spain vows to curb migrant wave. Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5313560.stm.
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shared worldwide. Therefore, we believe that the EU
should do its utmost to integrate its diverse foreign policy
commitments to Africa and make them more coherent in
order for the Partnership on climate change to not en-
croach on other policy areas. Moreover, we also believe
that the EU and its African partners should engage all de-
velopment actors operating in Africa to incorporate and
link climate change issues in their development projects.
However, it is worth noting that in order for that strategy
to be effective, it has got has to clearly be in tune with the
poverty reduction policies in place aligned with the Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Third, we also believe that the African leaders them-
selves should address climate change as a development
issue and institute policies that counter its major im-
pacts on human development and sustainable economic
growth. In sum, we consider that once those recommen-
dations that we have proposed above are taken into ac-
count by the African and the European policymakers
alike, the Africa-EU Partnership on Climate Change willFigure 2 Key facts: Africa to Europe migration. Source: http://news.bbcbe a robust policy that both sides can use to combat the
adverse effects of the climate change in Africa and pro-
gressively help her transition to low carbon economy.
Furthermore, as regards to the security implications of
the climate change on fragile states in Africa, the con-
cern is that impacted fragile states might easily disinte-
grate and that could have untold security consequences
across the continent and beyond. That is, given that
many of the African states are already struggling to pro-
vide basic state functions to their citizenry, an additional
security issue emanating from the climate change may
increase instability and make matters worse for those
failing states.
EU-Africa´s strategic alliance and climate change
The leadership of the European Union in climate change
diplomacy is widely recognized and accepted within the
international community (Pinder and Usherwood 2007).
The EU has been at the forefront of the negotiations to
address and combat the climate change challenges at the
international level. And at the same time it has been.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6228236.stm.
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the Caribbean Islands Developing States and their Pacific
Islands counterparts in its quest to reach a binding and
accepted multilateral agreement on the climate change
threats and challenges. From the political viewpoint, on
the one hand, it has been one of the main promoters if
not the principal promoter of the global dialogue within
the UNFCCC. On a strategic level, on the other hand, the
EU has also played a major role in setting the agendas of
the climate change negotiations at the international and
global level. In the last quarter of a century, the European
Union has been one of the leading voices in setting the
agendas to combat the global climate change threats in
the international forums; as noted above. This agenda
setting in the international climate policy has been pos-
sible because of policies enacted domestically within the
EU. That is to say, policies agreed on by the Commission
and the member states (EU Climate Change Policy is a
shared-competence policy (Art. 4 (2e) TFEU) devised to
combat the climate change threats. For example, the six
Environmental Action Programme, approved by the
Council and the Parliament, contained a ten-year frame-
work for promoting sustainable development in the fields
of climate change, nature and diversity, environment and
health, and natural resources and waste, The result of
that has been the prioritization of the climate change as a
policy area within the overall strategy of the EU sustain-
able development policy. As a case in point, with the ap-
proval of the sixth environmental action program, in that
same year, the EU played a leading role in the World
Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa
(Pinder and Usherwood 2007).
During the negotiations leading to the signing of the
Kyoto Protocol, the European Union clearly played a
leading role in shaping the positions of the group of the
Sub-Saharan African Countries. Its proposal on a `differ-
entiation mechanism´ based on the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities convinced many African
countries and larger developing countries alike to follow its
lead and agree with it during the KP negotiations. That was
so because the rationale behind the `differentiation mech-
anism´ simply recognized the historical contribution of the
industrialized countries in contributing disproportionately
to the emission of the carbon dioxide (CO2) and other
greenhouse gases. And on the contrary, the mechanism did
not require that the developing countries and in particular
African countries whose contributions to the global green-
house emissions have been historically trivial cut their
emissions, since doing so would adversely affect their eco-
nomic growth and developments. At the same time, the
European Union proposed that the Kyoto Protocol set the
framework or guidelines through which developing coun-
tries could use alternative means of production that would
be environmentally friendly, to say the least.Moreover, as a sign of leadership in addressing the glo-
bal climate change challenge, the EU unilaterally made a
commitment under the Kyoto Protocol to achieve at
least a 20% reduction of its greenhouse gas emissions
(GGE) by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. In addition, the
EU also endorsed an objective to reduce its GHG emis-
sion by 30% as its contribution to an overall global and
comprehensive agreement for the post-2012 period. This
endorsement is however, incumbent upon an equal com-
mitment by other developed countries to reduce their
GHG emissions and a commitment also by the econom-
ically more advanced developing countries to do likewise
in accordance to their responsibilities and respective
capabilitiest. By doing that, it set the agenda for the
international community at large and the African con-
tinent in particular to accept the search for a more ef-
fective and decisive action to confront the challenges of
the global warming while recognizing and accepting the
principle of common and differentiated responsibility.
This principle however, did not impede countries from
carrying-out their fair share of responsibility to limit the
global temperature increase to no more than 2°C.
By recognizing the climate change challenges as a for-
eign policy concern, the EU came to the realization then
that it would effectively advance its climate change policy
agendas on a global level if it engaged Africa as a stra-
tegic partner via enhanced political dialogue. This is in
contrast to the uncooperative stance that the United
States government has taken against the ratification of
the Kyoto Protocol. This realization resulted in an en-
hanced Africa-EU Partnership on climate change, drafted
into the 2007 joint-Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) document.
Thus, this would be the instrument that both continents
would use in their cooperation to tackle their energy se-
curity challenges and environmental concerns, among
which the climate change is of the highest priority. The
Africa-EU Strategic Partnership and a Joint Africa-EU
Strategy document came about as a reaction to what
Europe and Africa perceived to be a solution for the new
threats and issues that required joint responses and coor-
dinated efforts based on common vision and shared
interests.
The Partnership on climate change is designed to
provide (a) a platform for dialogue, cooperation and
exchange for tangible measures to respond to climate
change between Africa and the European Union; (b) to
have close links to the GCCA and the ClimDev Africa
Programme (ClimDev); and (c) to represent an inte-
grated framework for Africa-EU co-operation on cli-
mate change. The partnership has two priority actions
and each priority has its own objectives. That is, the
first priority action is defined as `common agenda on
climate change policies and co-operation´ and its objec-
tives are as follows: 1) “enhanced dialogue, and common
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change challenges in Africa, Europe and globally, in par-
ticular in view to the negotiations for a global and compre-
hensive post-2012 climate agreement”; 2) “strengthened
capacities to adapt to climate change and to mitigate its
negative effects”. Furthermore, according to the Partner-
ship, the following were the expected outcomes of the
joint policy:
1) a strengthened Africa-EU dialogue on the develop-
ment, implementation and further improvement of cli-
mate change related initiatives and treaties, in particular
in view of the negotiations of a global and comprehensive
post-2012 climate agreement; 2) systematic integration of
climate change into African national and regional devel-
opment strategies as well as into Africa-EU development
cooperation; 3) increased capacity in African countries to
adapt to climate change and mitigate its negative effects,
including through climate risk management and resili-
ence to deal with climate-related disasters; 4) improved
data, analytical methods and infrastructure for sectoral
Climate Risk Management (CRM), monitoring climate
variability and detecting climate change with strength-
ened observation networks and service in centres in
Africa; 5) reduced rates of deforestation and better pres-
ervation of forest ecosystems, while improving the liveli-
hood of forest dependent populations; 6) increased
benefits for Africa from participation in the global carbon
market and enhanced capacity of African negotiators in
the international market; and 7) increased energy effi-
ciency and resilience to climate change in the African
economies.
The second priority action is defined as `cooperation
on land degradation and increased aridity, including the
Green Wall for the Sahara Initiative´ and its principal ob-
jective is as follows: to “combat desertification and im-
prove the livelihoods of the inhabitants of the countries
of the Sahara and Sahel zones of Africa (see Figure 3 as
an illustration of land degradation in Africa). “The out-
come that was expected from the second priority action
in accordance with the Partnership is a described below:
1) Progress towards reversal of desert encroachment
and soil degradation;
2) Improvement of micro-climatic conditions and
reduction of land degradation.
Hence, the extracted statement below from the Africa-
EU-partnership website and the picture shown in the
following page further explain the aims of the GGWSSI
projects in Africa.
“A number of cross-sectoral actions are underway to
address desertification/land degradation and other
pressing environmental issues in the circum Saharaand Sahel zones, such as climate change adaptation,
water shortages and biodiversity loss. This African
regional framework programme, entitled the Great
Green Wall of the Sahara and Sahel initiative
(GGWSSI), aims to tackle both environmental and
poverty-related challenges.”
In addition to the objectives, outcomes and priority ac-
tions of the Africa-EU Partnership on Climate Change as
described-above, the partnership also aimed at making
the African populations its primary beneficiaries while
reducing the impact of climate change on their environ-
ment. The partnership particularly seeks to enhance the
sustainable land management in order to help increase
growth and improve the livelihood of the African rural
populations. In concrete, the African farmers and most
vulnerable segments of the population, with limited ac-
cess to water and victims of the food price volatility and
insecurity are the primary targets of the Partnership. The
Partnership involves various important stakeholders from
the UN, Africa and Europe in order to effectively and
positively contribute to its success. The main actors be-
hind it are the African Union and the European Union
Member States; the African Union Commission and its
European Union counterpart; the African Development
Bank (AfDB); the United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa; the African Regional Economic Communities
(RECs) responsible for environmental management issues
and the Civil Society Organizations from the two conti-
nents. As of today, a considerable amount of progress
has been achieved in certain areas where the partners
have been working together even though the Partnership
is only 3 years old. Examples of the achievements can be
cited as follows:
“Enhanced political dialogue and cooperation
predominantly under the EU Global Climate Change
Alliance; reinforcement of African negotiator´s
capacities in international climate negotiations;
strengthening African possibilities to better exploit
opportunities under the carbon market; water
resources management and adaptation in the field of
agriculture; and sustainable land management, fight
against desertification and avoiding deforestation.”
In addition to the progress noted- above, the Partner-
ship has made concrete inroads, in that we can state the
following:
“the joint-EU-Africa declaration on climate change
adopted on December 2008 in Addis Ababa has
provided concrete opportunities for cooperation and
dialogue in relation to the negotiations in the run-up
to the Copenhagen Conference. This is continuing in
Fighting the sands of time
Figure 3 Fighting the sands of time. Source: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/successstories/fighting-sands-time.
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2010) and beyond; the channeling of € 45 M of EU
financial support in the period 2008–2010 under the
Global Climate Change Alliance Initiative (GCCA).
This financial support has been already provided to
six African countries (Mali, Mauritius, Rwanda,
Senegal, Seychelles and Tanzania). The programming
of the GCCA 2010 interventions in Ethiopia and
Mozambique is currently being finalized; GCCA
interventions in Africa support the implementation of
National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA)
Priorities fostering climate resilience in the water
management, rural development and agriculture
sectors and enhancing institutional capacity to
mainstream climate change into policy, regulatory and
strategic development planning; a contribution of
€ 8 M has been provided in 2009 to the ClimDev
Africa flagship initiative and to the AU Commission
climate change and desertification coordination
efforts; and preparation of the Great Green Wall for
the Sahara and Sahel Initiative implementation phase
through cross-sectoral actions aimed at sustainable
management of natural resources.”
As previously stated, the Africa-EU Partnership on Cli-
mate Change has two priority actions with each carrying
its own objectives (see notes above). The two main flag-
ship initiatives of the partnership are the GGWSSI,
which was initiated and led by Africa and the GCCA,
which was the European Commission initiative designed
to assist mainly the LDCs and SIDS and aimed at the
sustainable management of their natural resources.
Thus, from 2008–2010, the Commission and the Mem-
ber States made available around € 100 million from the
EU budget and bilateral contributions for vulnerablecountries. In addition, the Commission made available an-
other € 40 million as part of the 10th European Develop-
ment Fund (EDF) for the promotion of regional
approaches and assistance in the ACP grouping of coun-
tries. As such, it was expected that by 2011, the GCCA
initiative would support activities in many of the vulner-
able countries. The African countries that have been pro-
vided financial support through the initiative are Mali,
Mauritius, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles and Tanzania.
Ethiopia and Mozambique have been selected to benefit
from the initiative as well; but as of time of writing, they
are pending the finalization of the process. Each benefi-
ciary country will receive a country-tailored support on
climate change issues and an enhanced political dia-
logue with the EU as stipulated into the Africa-EU Joint
Strategy. For further details on the GCCA, see Table 2
below.
The third Africa-EU Summit was held in Tripoli,
Libya, in November 2010. During that Summit, the
Heads of State and Government of Africa and the Euro-
pean Union reiterated their commitments to maintain
the Joint Africa-EU Strategy as the framework for their
future cooperation and adopted as a result, the second
Action Plan 2011–2013 as their firm commitment to
pursuing the realization of their Partnership. They rec-
ognized the pressing issues that the world was facing at
the turn of the last decade and called for the reaffirm-
ation of their partnership to address them. Those issues
were stated as tackling the effects of climate change, con-
flict prevention, good governance, achieving a sustainable
energy market including investment particularly in re-
newable energy resources, providing food security, achiev-
ing the Millennium Development Goals, combatting
HIV/AIDS and addressing the realities and challenges of
migration and its links to development.










Tanzania 2008 Financing Agreement with the
Government of Tanzania
2010-2013 16/06/2010 Eco-villages Agriculture and land use Natural
Resource Management
Mali 2009 Financing Agreement with the
Government of Mali
2011-2016 7/12/2010 Mainstreaming CC Forestry Gov. Capacity Building
Mauritius 2009 Financing Agreement with the
Government of Mauritius
2010-2015 03/08/2010 Sustainable Development Mainstreaming CC
Rwanda 2009 Financing Agreement with the
Government of Rwanda
2010-2013 12/05/2010 Land use
Senegal 2009 Financing Agreement with the
Government of Senegal
2010-2013 19/10/2010 Coastal Zone Protection
Seychelles 2009 Financing Agreement with the
Government of Seychelles
2010-2013 14/07/201 Sustainable Development Energy and CDM
Ethiopia 2010 N/A Mainstreaming CC Gov. Capacity building Water and
Agriculture Land Management
Mozambique 2010 N/A Gov. Capacity Building Raising Public Awareness
Agriculture and Land Use
Source: http://www.gcca.eu/cgi-bin/view.pl?&page=41&lg=2&url_content=GCCA-Beneficiaries.
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specifically focus on the five components of the 13 priority
areas identified by the Joint Africa-EU Joint Group on Cli-
mate Change in November 2008. The deliverable initiatives
from the five components identified as priority areas of the
Partnership are “the Great Green Wall of the Sahara and
the Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI); the CLIMDEV and AMESD
programs; the activity of building and enhancing African
negotiators´ capacity in negotiations under the UNFCCC;
the GCCA and the fight against deforestationu.” It is worth
noting that the Africa-EU Partnership on Climate Change
second Action Plan addresses disparate issues from cross-
cutting areas. One project that is worth mentioning as part
of the capacity building, though initiated from the first Ac-
tion Plan, emanating from the Africa-EU Partnership in
favor of sustainable development is the Congo Basin Coun-
tries Capacity Building on GHG Inventories. This type of
training initiative is a concrete example of how the EU as-
sists African countries to build their capacity in taking stock
of their emission and effectively participate in the inter-
national negotiations relating to the climate change govern-
ance. In particular, the Partnership for Forests of the Congo
Basin provides support and capacity building to the mem-
ber countries of the Commission of Forests of Central Af-
rica in international negotiations over climate change. The
partnership aims at assisting those countries in the calcula-
tion of GHG emissions and providing them with training
on the so-called mechanism for Reduction Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation in developing countries
(REDD). Hence, the Africa-EU Partnership is only three to
four years old, but the intensity and scope of the Partner-
ship has been present throughout the latest international
climate change negotiations, i.e., the Copenhagen and Dur-
ban Conferences.Challenges, implications and policy
recommendations
There are many challenges to the Africa-EU Partnership
on Climate Change that need to be addressed by both
partners if the partnership is to have a long-lasting suc-
cess despite what it has achieved so far. It is true that the
Partnership is in its early operational phase, but one can
already see that the main actors that are driving the part-
nership are still the official institutions, be they African
Union Commission and the respective African States or
the European Union Commission and its Member States.
The partnership needs to be more people centered rather
than institutionally driven in order for it to have a real
impact on the people’s lives. Besides, we believe that the
partnership will have wide range positive effects if the
private sector and academia are called upon to fully par-
ticipate in addition to fostering the full involvement of
the civil society organizations. Also, the European Union
needs to sort out the issues of financing and earmark
funds that can specifically be used for the purpose of
combatting climate change. In doing so, it will avoid
using finances from the EDF that are earmarked for de-
velopment projects in programs and areas that address
climate change issues. That is so because for Africa, de-
velopment concerns are still a priority even though it is
clear that climate change adaptation and mitigation are
to be part of its overall sustainable strategies if it is to
transit to the low carbon green economy.
Moreover, other impediments of great importance that
in our view need to be addressed by both parties are the
apparent EU policy incoherence in the fields of energy,
trade and agriculture and the lack of resources by the
African side when it comes to disbursing local funds to
tackle climate change challenges. On the EU side, it is
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Community is a shared policy, that is, the Commission
and the EU Member States share powers in decision-
making related to the climate change towards third coun-
tries. Thus, this is a clear challenge to the Africa-EU
Partnership on Climate Change. However, it is also im-
portant to recognize that the EU has made important pro-
gress in streamlining its incoherent policies by adhering to
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and attempting
to mainstream the climate change issues by linking them
into its development cooperation policy strategies towards
Africa. On the Africa side, there is a myriad of challenges
that need to be addressed if adapting and mitigating the
effects of the climate change were to be effective. Chief
among them, in our view, is providing capacity develop-
ment to all African stakeholders when dealing with
everything climate change, whether at governmental or
non-governmental level. This is in addition to the financial
challenges that Africa clearly faces when addressing cli-
mate change problems considering that development
challenges are the primary concerns of the African gov-
ernments and their leaders.
Furthermore, another significant challenge that the
Africa-EU Partnership on climate change faces in our
view is how to circumvent the growing influence of emer-
ging powers such as China, India and Brazil in the inter-
national climate change politics. That is to say, despite the
strategic nature of the partnership, Africa is of the view
that the parties that have historically contributed to the
global warming effects pay the most. This assertion is
clearly the position of many developing countries and es-
pecially the larger ones such as China, India, Brazil and
South Africa. Consequently, this can limit the scope of the
Africa-EU Partnership on climate change and make the
EU less influential on its African partners despite the sol-
emn declaration of the partnership. As a case in point,
during the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change
the EU clearly struggled to have full African support be-
hind it because Africans clearly sided in their policy ap-
proach with the above-mentioned emerging countries.
Conclusions
The likelihood that climate change risks can affect the
international security is hotly debated in recent years by
the international community. The United States, EU and
many other countries have commissioned studies to look
into the potential impacts of the climate change on their
national security. The European Union, over many years,
has taken a leadership role at fostering international co-
operation in seeking to tackle the climate change threats
through its diverse policy tools and initiatives with dis-
parate regions of the world. The EU is particularly weary
of spill-over effects of climate change threats whereby
induced-climate migrations from third nations can haveincalculable consequences on its territory. In that regard,
it has developed specific policies to address the impacts
of climate change in many developing countries and fos-
ter greater international cooperation in that respect. By
recognizing that the threats of the climate change are
multidimensional and no one country alone can address
them effectively, the EU and the African Union have
adopted joint-policy initiatives to tackle the issues of cli-
mate change.
This reality and many other issues of global concerns
brought the European Union and Africa to enter into
strategic partnerships and adopted the Joint Africa-EU
Strategy as a guiding document to tackle many issues of
common concern, inter alia, the Africa-EU Partnership
on Climate Change. Given what has been accomplished
so far in terms of concrete policies and deliverables based
on the Action Plan 1 & II of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy,
the Partnership on climate change between the two con-
tinents can be considered a success considering that it
has only been in operation for five years. However, this
does not mean that there are no issues of concern and
disagreements between the two parties that are not worth
addressing in order to make the Partnership more effect-
ive and inclusive. For example, issues such as the inco-
herence of the EU policies in various fields towards
Africa have been of great concern for both parties in their
view of the Africa-EU Partnership on climate change.
In addition, on the African side in particular, challenges
regarding the capacity building on climate change adap-
tation and mitigation have also been a great concern in
its partnership on climate change with the EU. Last but
not least, both sides have come to recognize that con-
cerns on the climate change should not supersede the de-
velopment and poverty reduction goals of the African
continent. However, the challenge is how to link climate
change issues and development issues in a balanced and
coherent manner that is beneficial to Africa and respon-
sive to its international climate change obligations.
Endnotes
aSee The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Working Group II contribution to the Fourth Assess-
ment Report: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability,
http://www.ipcc.ch/working_groups/working_groups.
shtml.
bSee Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
Fourth Assessment Report.
cSee United Nations 2004 High Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility.
dSee UNDP, Human Development Report 1994 (Oxford
University Press, 1994).
eSee UN Security Council Letter dated 5 April 2007 from
the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of
Dodo SpringerPlus 2014, 3:194 Page 18 of 18
http://www.springerplus.com/content/3/1/194Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council.
fCAN 2007, National Security and the Threat of Climate
Change, Military Advisory Board.
gSee Security Council Debate on Climate Change as a
threat to International Peace and Security, 17 April 2007
hSee European Council (2008a) `Climate Change and
International Security: Paper from the High Representa-
tive and the European Commission to the European
Council´. S113/08, 14 March.
iSee European Council (2008b) `Report on the Imple-
mentation of the European Security Strategy: Providing
Security in a Changing World´. S407/08, 11 December.
jSee Special Euro Barometer 300, Europeans´ attitudes
towards climate change, September 2008.
kSee The African Union's response to climate change
and climate security, Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, Institute for se-
curity studies, Pretoria.
lSee Elliott et al. 2012. (Eds.), Climate Change, Migra-
tion and Human Security in Southeast Asia (Singapore:
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),
p.5.
mThe Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Working Group II contribution to the Fourth Assess-
ment Report: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability,
Cambridge University Press. 2007.
nThe EU Troika here refers to the EU foreign minis-
tries holding the EU Presidency, and the country that
will hold the Presidency next, the European Commission
and the EU Council´s general secretariat.
oSee The Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness
in Africa: Promise & Performance. A Joint report by: the
Economic Commission for Africa and the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development 2011.
pSee Wahlqvist (2009) in Connected Community and
Household Food-Based Strategy (CCH-FBS): Its Import-
ance for Health, Food Safety, Sustainability and Security
in Diverse Localities.
qSee Wahlqvist et al. (2012) in Rethinking the food se-
curity debate in Asia: some missing ecological and
health dimensions and solution.
rIbid. p. 667.
sIbid. p. 667.
tSee Africa-EU Declaration on Climate Change during
the 11th Ministerial Meeting of the African and EU
Troikas. Addis Ababa, 20–21 November 2008.
uSee JAES Action Plan 2011–2013 Partnership on Cli-
mate Change and Environment.
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